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had the right to become independent, and they boldly declared that henceforth the coast would no longer be part of Kenya. A few weeks later, a police raid on what they described as a training camp led to the detention of some of those associated with the letter.
In 2010, in the context of the referendum on the new constitution, the letter's authors renewed their campaign of letter-writing; the new letters were addressed to parliamentarians in Kenya, and in the East African assembly. Like the letter to the Queen, they were photocopied and circulated as a By late 2011 people claiming to speak for the MRC were calling for a boycott of the elections, and police were breaking up meetings associated with the MRC and making significant numbers of arrests.
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As a vivid expression of coastal grievances, the call for secession evidently attracted a degree of sympathy. The sense that the coast has lost out is widespread -strikingly, the coast was the only one of the former provinces of Kenya in which an opinion poll in 2013 showed that a majority 1 Much of the discussion here echoes the argument made in Willis and Gona, 'Pwani C Kenya?'. 2 Mazrui, 'Ethnic voices and trans-ethnic voting'. 3 Brennan, 'Lowering the Sultan's flag'. 4 Willis and Gona, 'Pwani C Kenya?', 'Politicians told to keep off MRC affairs', The Star, 29 Sep. 2011 < http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-47507/politicians-told-keep-mrc-affairs> (13 June 2013) ; '15 members of illegal MRC deny oath charge ', The Star, 27 Sep. 2011 <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-47838/15-members-illegal-mrc-deny-oathcharge> (13 June 2013 ; '18 members of banned gang seized', Daily Nation, 24 Oct. 2011 < http://www.nation.co.ke/News/regional/18-members-of-banned-gang-seized-/-/1070/1261290/-/qosn9gz/-/index.html> (13 June 2013) . believed that they were worse off than in 2007. 6 The clumsy brutality with which meetings were broken up encouraged this, as did a sense of dissatisfaction with elected politicians. 7 Those who claimed to speak for the MRC pulled the rug from under the feet of coast parliamentarians with a vivid articulation of coastal grievances which offered a dramatic inversion of politics-as-normal:
suddenly, the shabbily-dressed and marginal were asserting that law and international treaties were on their side. The style and language of those who claimed the MRC mantle were quite distinct:
unlike civil society activists and politicians, they were not college-educated, English-speaking and smartly dressed, and they rejected calls to form into a civil society organization or a political party.
That politicians felt threatened by the MRC was clear enough. Many coast MPs rushed to express their understanding of the MRC's concerns, even as they denounced its stated political goals. 8 When Najib Balala launched his new party in early October 2012, he went out of his way to mention the concerns of the MRC. 9 Some commentators noted that the initials of his Republican Congress party, combined with the prancing horse which was its symbol, seemed to have been arranged to look rather like the letters MRC.
But despite this apparent popularity, it was clear from the outset that 'the MRC' was not closelydisciplined in its organization, or coherent in its message. There have been various reports of membership cards and the payment of subscriptions, and claims to an elaborate hierarchy of branches office-holders, but in practice the name of the MRC has been available for appropriation by anyone who cares to use it, leading to considerable uncertainty over its agenda and constituency.
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That uncertainty reveals a fundamental weakness: the shared sense of marginalization has not itself been enough to create a real political community of wapwani, or 'coasterians', because the potential community is deeply divided as to how exactly to understand their marginalization. Perhaps ironically, the wapwani may seem most cohesive when viewed from elsewhere in Kenya:
the Coast -as an imagination -always emerges when the rest of Kenya is conversing with, or about, the region. "Coasterians" is a word which emerged and was used by up-country students to refer to students from the former Coast Province who secured places to study in the prestigious national schools that were all located outside the Coast. 11 A striking feature of 2012 and 2013 was the way in which the MRC became the way in which 'up-country' debated with and about the 'the Coast', in a language which was often accusatory or recriminatory. Participants on both sides of that debate repeatedly evoked two contrasting images of Kenya: as the inclusive nation which embraces the coast, and as a distinctive up-country world which is culturally and politically remote. 12 But from within, it was much less clear who the wapwani were, or how they should understand their position. Mohammad Dor had been arrested for saying publicly that he would be willing to 'help' the detained men if requested, there was some public surprise both that Sonko decided to offer bail, and that he was allowed to provide it. 24 The released men restated their commitment to peaceful methods, but also repeated their calls for an election boycott.
or announced their intention of standing as candidates. 27 As the campaigns began, it was apparent that people were far more likely to turn up for election rallies than for anti-election demonstrations.
Meanwhile, oathing of young men was reported to be continuing, though it was not clear who was paying for it, or what exactly the oaths bound them to do. 28 Leaflets threatening those who registered or voted were circulated; some of them specifically threatened people of up-country origin.
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There were further minor incidents involving attacks on the police. 30 Then, on the eve of the election itself, came the most coordinated violence of all: in the space of a few hours police patrols were attacked in the Mombasa suburbs of Miritini and Mshomoroni and a polling station was attacked in the suburb of Mlaleo. Shortly afterwards, a chief's camp was attacked in the rural hinterland, in Jibana, and finally a tallying centre at Chumani, on the north coast, was briefly overrun by a gang which destroyed vehicles as well as attacking people. In all ten security officers and around nine other people were reported killed. The attacks were all similar -perpetrated by young men, dressed in blue or black clothes with red cloth tied around their heads, and armed with machetes. Quite how many were involved in total is not clear; nor is it clear if the attackers were all different, or belonged to one or two groups which moved from one attack on to the next by vehicle. 31 The security services seem to have been surprisingly unprepared for the attacks; and while some arrests were subsequently made (including, after a time, the nominal leaders of the MRC), a degree of mystery still hangs around these events. Whatever their intention, and whoever organized them, the effect of these attacks was evident but ultimately limited. In a number of polling stations, voting was significantly reduced: while all stations opened -though in some cases rather late -the police and/or the IEBC (it was not clear which)
closed some early, citing security concerns. A rough estimate suggests that voting was reduced by around two thousand people in the most directly-affected areas; the wider effect of the violence on turnout is really impossible to gauge. But still, the evidence of the poll is clear enough: overall, the MRC campaign did not lead to a boycott, nor did it create any new sense of unity among the 'coasterians'. Writing in the 1990s, Tom Wolf echoed an argument made by Richard Stren some twenty years earlier: despite the widespread sense of marginalization, a factional coastal politics have been dominated by up-country concerns, as divisions among the coast population consistently prove more powerful than any shared sense of coastal identity. 33 The evidence of the 2013 election seems to confirm the continuation of this pattern: despite the widespread use of the term wapwani, there is no real evidence of a coherent coastal political identity.
Electoral participation, patronage, and political culture
Increased participation in the elections is evidence not simply of the failure of the MRC. It shows how a political culture based on patronage and personal ties can draw people into a wider political system -involving even those who may more generally feel excluded and alienated. The results of this were complex. Alongside the overall increase in voter turnout, there was another striking feature of the elections of 2013 at the coast. Raila Odinga's presidential vote was significantly higher than in 2007 -not just in numbers, but as a proportion of the vote. as Magarini and Ganze, he received almost no votes at all, but in constituencies with a high proportion of Kikuyu settlers, such as Lamu West, he outpolled Raila. While opinion polls have been generally criticised for failing to predict Uhuru's victory in the presidential election nationally, on the coast they actually underestimated the extent of Raila's vote (the February IPSOS opinion poll had put Raila on 73% at the coast). It would be possible to explain this with a particularist coastal argument, linked to the new constitution. Since the 1950s, the idea of devolution has been popular at the coast; this was a stronghold of KADU in the early 1960s, and in the early 1990s it was the coast-based Shirikisho Party (among whose original founders was Chirau
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Mwakwere's elder brother) which was the most explicit advocate of a new majimboism. constitution provisions on devolution to match up with popular conceptions of devolution -which included strong local control for minerals, public sector service jobs, land and ports -reduced local enthusiasm for the new counties. And there was more than a little scepticism at the coast about the sincerity of Raila's interest in regional grievances, as was apparent from the somewhat cynical response to his announcement of a new 'taskforce' to investigate these grievances. 35 An understanding of the high turnout may, therefore, lie in an understanding of Kenyan politics and voter participation more widely; and through discussion of these we will suggest that the high turnout in the presidential contest was actually at least in part a by-product of the coincidence of multiple polls. George Gona's study of the 2007 election emphasised the importance of local factors in coastal elections; and it seems that in 2013, again many voters were participating primarily because of an interest in local contests -for governor, MP or even ward representative. In most African countries where there has been a meaningful movement towards multipartyism, one could be forgiven for thinking elections are an extension of the marketplace . .
. The public typically trades votes for more or less concrete pledges of expenditure.
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The 2013 campaign at the Kenya coast seems to fit both the particular analyses of Kenya and the wider argument. Candidates at every level promised jobs, development, and improved public services. Those who read manifestos in detail would have found differences between major parties, but campaigning -in rallies and meetings, in leaflets and on posters -was all about establishing the personal reliability and generosity of the individual candidates. manifestations of their existence are their 'offices', located in shuttered and deserted roadside shops or on the third-floor of shabby walk-up office blocks in less desirable parts of town, which double as the business address of a local patron. Then there are large parties, which burst into brief and dazzling existence for the purpose of an election. These large parties create offices, hire staff, and spend extremely large sums: but they rely on the energies and wealth of local patrons, and on the activation of business and social networks, rather than on a stable and enduring organization.
They are campaign machines, rather than being parties in the sense of bodies for deliberating policy.
ODM, and to some extent WDM, are combinations of these two kinds of party: they have been around for much longer than the Jubilee parties against which they were contending, but they too have almost nothing in the way of enduring structures. In a real sense they exist to gather and spend money for the campaign.
At the coast (and presumably elsewhere, too), parties of the first kind offered no financial support to their candidates in the 2013 elections, and almost nothing in terms of local organization. Their nominations were rarely the subject of contest; instead, they sold them, and in effect all they provided was a sort of counselling service for prospective candidates, guiding them through the bureaucratic processes of the election -the gathering of signatures of support, and the preparation of papers to submit to the IEBC. The big parties, by contrast, could offer financial support (though the extent of this evidently varied), and they used their networks of support to mobilize local activists in support of campaigns. Where a wealthy and influential local figure put their own money and social capital behind a national party which also had resources of its own, as with ODM in Mombasa, this could create a locally formidable electoral machine. However, it also created problems, in that hopefuls vying for the privilege of nomination suspected the local patron of favouritism towards particular aspirants, and the weakness of party organization made the nomination process deeply untransparent.
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Candidates were also of varying types. Many may have been motivated by the idea of public service; the post-election behaviour of the successful candidates is, however, a reminder that all were concerned also to secure the rewards of office, in terms of pay, status and privilege. 42 candidates had little personal wealth -or found that the campaign rapidly ran through their resources -but had a degree of social capital which others sought to harness to particular parties.
Some were sponsored by the start by patrons, who -in pursuit of their own wider interestsdecided which party they should stand for; others were forced to seek such patrons as the campaign progressed, and had to change parties. This had dramatic effect in Mombasa, where candidates associated with Hassan Joho -sitting MP for Kisauni, and candidate for the governorship -secured all the major nominations for ODM. Joho evidently spent freely on his own campaign, and in support of those who he favoured. The primaries were as chaotic at the coast as they were in elsewhere in Kenya, with multiple accusations of rigging, and with people who were neither registered voters nor ODM members apparently being allowed to participate in some places; the sense of chaos was confirmed by later complains from ODM staff that they had not been paid for their work. And, finally, there were some candidates, who knew that they had no realistic chance of winning, but who became candidates for big parties simply in order to gain sponsorship, in the expectation that the largesse they could offer in the course of their unsuccessful election bid would add to their local status. At the coast, this seems to have been particularly common with candidates for TNA, which became known as 'the money party'. Wealthy local TNA supporters sponsored candidates who they knew could not win simply in order to provide a focus for voter mobilization and a visible presence, with their eye on the importance of gathering presidential votes. In turn, these local patrons hoped to catch the eye, and the future favour, of national leaders. These multiple considerations drove many to compete for office, despite the cost of standing: 1,058 candidates stood for the 129 seats in the six county assembles; and 218 candidates for the 25 national assembly seats from the coast.
And quite apart from candidates and patrons, there were many people who offered themselves to candidates as national or local agents and intermediaries. Rivalrous elder men who claimed 'traditional' authority, clerics competing for recognition as religious leaders, coordinators of civil society organizations vying for influence -all saw the elections as an opportunity to pursue their interests. All insisted that they alone could speak for and influence 'their' constituency, whether they defined this as a particular ethnic group, a whole religious community, a congregation or simply the neighbourhood. All denounced other aspiring intermediaries as impostors. In return they demanded patronage from candidates -and sometimes from international donors seeking to provide electoral support. Self-proclaimed kaya elders blessed candidates or organized peace walks; preachers endorsed particular parties; earnest men who claimed to represent the grass-roots convened workshops where participants received lunch and 'sitting fees' in return for listening to explanations of the voting process or enduring homilies on the importance of peace.
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None of this meant that the election could simply be 'bought'. As Nugent's work on Ghana has argued, spending is only the first part of the 'transubstantiation' of money into moral authority.
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People expect candidates to show immediate generosity, but they also have to believe that those candidates will continue to be generous in the longer term. This inclines them to vote for those on whom they feel they have some claims -of kinship, ethnicity, marriage or locality; and it works against those sitting candidates who have acquired a reputation for failing to help their constituents.
The sitting MP for Kaloleni, Kazungu Kambi, earned the sobriquet Kazungu Pesa for his generous spending in his successful 2007 campaign. As a URP parliamentary candidate he sought to show similar generosity in 2013, but lost to a candidate from a minor party who spent much less. But across the coast, demands of financing linked candidates -and intermediaries, and voters -into networks of patronage which were tied in to a wider, national, economy and politics. Involvement in a political campaign on the coast was a lesson to all involved that it was indeed a part of Kenya.
Money, and the tempting possibility of access to office and resources, ran through the elections to the lowest level.
Through these multiple local contests and rivalries -some of which were really nothing do with elections -electoral politics worked their way deep into society. With five local positions being contested, many people will have to come to the end of the campaign with some individual or community stake: a relative running, or a candidate who had promised to help their family or clan with a job or a long-running legal dispute, or to improve local health services -or simply someone 49 For competing Muslim intermediaries, see: Hassan ole Naado, 'Muslims should take sides but on principle', who had given them a sack of flour or a few hundred shillings. Significant numbers of people were thus drawn into the process, not as an act of faith in the constitution, but through the politics of patronage.
That Raila seems ultimately to have benefitted more than Uhuru from these multiple relationships of patronage at the coast may seem surprising. With the possible exception of Mombasa County, it is not evident that politicians associated with CORD spent more than those associated with Jubilee at the coast; and the links between the presidential contest and the local flow of patronage were not by any means straightforward. It might be argued rather that, for those who were drawn into voting by the patronage of an aspiring MP or governor, the presidential choice was actually a secondary choice. The detailed results show no consistency in terms of votes for the two coalitions at various levels of election: in Lamu county, CORD parties attracted only about 7% of votes for members of the national assembly, and won neither of the two seats; they secured 18% of votes for county ward representatives, winning two of the 10 county assembly seats -and Raila took 53% of the presidential vote. In Mombasa, more than 20,000 of those who voted for one of the two rival CORD candidates for the governorship seem to have voted for Uhuru in the presidential election; in Kilifi, on the other hand, two-thirds of those who voted for Jubilee candidates for national assembly seats did not vote for Uhuru in the presidential election. There is a clear overall pattern to this. Many of those who voted for Raila voted for non-CORD candidates at other levels of the election only 314,000 coast voters supported CORD candidates for county assembly seats; but 612,000 voted for Raila as president. And many of the 228,000 coastal voters who chose Jubilee candidates for national or county assembly representative did not vote for Uhuru as president, or for Jubilee gubernatorial candidates: 228,000 voters supported Jubilee candidates for national assembly seats; and 191,000
supported Jubilee candidates for county assembly seats: but only 158,000 voted for Uhuru.
These disparities reflect the weakness of party organization, and the importance local patronage.
But they also suggest that the continued, widespread sense of coastal marginalization, and particularly injustice over land -however uncertainly focussed that might be -seems to have made people less inclined to vote for Uhuru, even when they were willing to vote for a TNA or URP candidate in a local race. Although Uhuru and Ruto campaigned hard to overturn this perception;
the constant stream of conflicts between squatters and landowners during the campaign meant that this issue was never far from the public eye. to ban discussion of land issues during the campaign only served to heighten the sensitivity over this.
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Local variation
These patronage dynamics played out variously in different contexts along the coast. The nominations left the Mombasa branches of the two parties of the CORD coalition on opposing sides of a deeply acrimonious gubernatorial race, which spilled over to other levels of the contest. Shahbal repeatedly In Lamu, ODM had never established a presence. The significant feature of the election here was the considerable population in Lamu West constituency, many of whom are Kikuyu. Concentrated around the Lake Kenyatta settlement scheme, they seem to have displayed considerable sense of political community in the campaign and in the vote; and while the more sparsely-populated constituency of Lamu East saw much popular concern about the development of the new Lamu port -which presumably was a factor in the very high turnout there -the substantial voting bloc from 57 'Zoning, tribes and party waves dominate search for Kwale CEO', Digital Standard, 4 Feb 2013 won by a Kikuyu candidate, presumably because the Bajuni vote was divided between candidates;
Kikuyu candidates also won a series of county ward seats, and the successful candidate for governor had a Kikuyu deputy.
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Electoral problems and appeals
The coast saw the same technical problems as other parts of the country: the electronic voter identification kits (EVIDs) were slow to get working (because of password problems) and soon ran out of power in places without mains electricity; and the printed paper register was not quite the same as the version on the EVID, or that in the 'green book' record held at constituency level. On the coast, as elsewhere, these difficulties slowed down the polling, and voters had to queue, sometimes for long periods. But these difficulties were no greater, and no less, than those elsewhere, and the queues at the coast were generally shorter than those up-country, because the turnout was slightly lower.
The count, too, saw the same problems that were experienced elsewhere. Transmission of results from the polling stream by text message proved impossible; results and ballot boxes went together to the constituency tallying centres, where the process moved very slowly and tiredness created many possibilities for human error. That each polling stream had six boxes, and associated paper records; and that most polling stations had several streams, created a situation ripe for muddle.
Candidates and agents showed a strange combination of laxity and hyper-sensitivity: some evidently anomalous results were announced without comment, but rumours of ballot boxes lost, and of ballot papers spotted floating out to sea, were circulated with feverish excitement. At the Nyali constituency centre one complete set of ballot boxes arrived, apparently without polling staff or police guard; almost a full day passed before the presiding officer was found. A stray single ballot box, for a county ward representative, was eventually reunited with the rest of the boxes from that The confusion created a fertile atmosphere for suspicion. In Mombasa, almost from the close of the polls, the other gubernatorial candidates were accusing Hassan Joho of every conceivable form of malpractice, from vote-buying to the stuffing of ballot boxes. Two days after the election, while the tallying was still in process, they held a collective press conference (evidently organized by Suleiman Shahbal) in which they rejected the as-yet unannounced results and announced that they would go to court. Najib Balala took the opportunity to accuse ODM of seeking to rig the presidential poll as well; Shahbal announced that he would be contesting all the ballots except the presidential one, and subsequently went to court. 64 The other counties did not see quite this level of drama, but the delays, muddles and accusations were common across the coast, with almost all of the attention being focussed not on the presidential poll but on governors, MP and county representative positions. A flurry of legal challenges to results was evidently driven by the same bitter local rivalries and jealousies -between individual candidates, their patrons, and the communities which they sought to represent -which pushed electoral participation.
The unwillingness of particular candidates to accept defeat offers an interesting counterpoint to the apparent wider resignation at the coast in the face of the presidential outcome. As elsewhere in Kenya, there were rumours of possible discontent in the run-up to the announcement of the results, and prior to the Supreme Court ruling on Raila's legal challenge. In the event there were no significant popular demonstrations; partly, no doubt, because the police had made clear that these would be violently repressed. The weeks after the elections saw some further sporadic attacks on police by 'raiders', but these lacked the apparent coordination and scale of the election eve attacks.
More than a quarter of respondents in a survey at the coast in June 2013 thought that the presidential elections had been flawed; only 55% thought them 'generally free and fair' -slightly below the national average of 60%. Strikingly, levels of confidence in the other elections at the coast were considerably higher, with only 10% of respondents thinking that the governor and national assembly polls were 'not free and fair' -this broadly reflected the national pattern. 65 Evidently, acceptance of the presidential results was not based on widespread faith in the process.
Conclusion
Across Kenya, the 2013 elections were much more peaceful than many had feared; and across Kenya, they saw generally high levels of participation, though with some significant regional intensity where it occurred, but was very localised; the results were generally accepted by the electorate (though not by some defeated candidates); and -most significantly -there was a high level of participation by voters. The elections revealed the failure -for now, at least -of the attempt to mobilise a secessionist coastal movement which was united by the legitimating power of colonial treaties. That failure may partly have been due to the weakness of the historical claims involved, which entirely misrepresent the treaties concerned. But it is more likely a result of the fundamentally divided nature of the imagined 'coasterian' community. Perhaps unsurprisingly, within weeks of the election one of the 'leaders' of the MRC was asking to meet with Uhuru, and offering to abandon the aim of secession. 66 While those who claimed to speak for the MRC insisted that the coast was not Kenya, the elections had showed that in a very profound, everyday, way the coast is part of Kenya -its population woven into the neo-patrimonial fabric of Kenyan political life, with its emphasis on personal contact, the giving of gifts and the seeking of favours. Participation levels were undoubtedly raised by one of the innovations of the 2013 elections: the simultaneity of the poll for multiple kinds of office (some newly created), which encouraged multiple, overlapping contests over patronage and clientilism, significantly increasing both the overall cost of the elections and the incentives for voter participation. Party affiliation and political programmes were largely irrelevant in the great majority of these contests: candidates won partly by showy distribution of gifts, but also by persuading voters that they could be relied on to respond to future requests for assistance in dealing with financial troubles, or with the multiple manifestations of Kenya's statewhich is bureaucratic in shape, but profoundly patrimonial in the face which it presents to most of the population.
The elections at the coast might, therefore, be seen as broadly positive in terms of Kenya's political stability: violence was (mostly) avoided; Kenyans at the coast reaffirmed their involvement in a political culture shared with rest of the country. But increased political participation is entirely compatible with a continued sense of 'marginalization', as the moral compact between candidates and voters is partly based on a popular sense of the unreliability and opacity of government. The statistics on the presidential vote suggest the power of that sense of marginalization. At the coast, the presidential campaign was the only element of the elections which really did raise questions of national policy, with devolution and land as the central issues. Raila offered little detail as to how he would solve the complex, layered (and often contradictory) grievances over land at the coast, nor much on devolution beyond a promise to implement it. But his very vocal expression of intent to address these issues favoured him; and there was evident popular scepticism over Uhuru's
